Securing Data in Transit using Two Channel Communication by Wolfe, Clark L.
Air Force Institute of Technology
AFIT Scholar
Theses and Dissertations Student Graduate Works
3-22-2018
Securing Data in Transit using Two Channel
Communication
Clark L. Wolfe
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd
Part of the Information Security Commons, and the Systems and Communications Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wolfe, Clark L., "Securing Data in Transit using Two Channel Communication" (2018). Theses and Dissertations. 1828.
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/1828
SECURING DATA IN TRANSIT USING TWO
CHANNEL COMMUNICATION
THESIS
Clark L. Wolfe, Capt, USAF
AFIT-ENG-MS-18-M-069
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR UNIVERSITY
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
The views expressed in this document are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the United States Air Force, the United States Department
of Defense or the United States Government. This material is declared a work of the
U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States.
AFIT-ENG-MS-18-M-069
SECURING DATA IN TRANSIT USING TWO CHANNEL COMMUNICATION
THESIS
Presented to the Faculty
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Graduate School of Engineering and Management
Air Force Institute of Technology
Air University
Air Education and Training Command
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Science in Electrical Engineering
Clark L. Wolfe, B.S.E.E.
Capt, USAF
March 2018
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
AFIT-ENG-MS-18-M-069
SECURING DATA IN TRANSIT USING TWO CHANNEL COMMUNICATION
THESIS
Clark L. Wolfe, B.S.E.E.
Capt, USAF
Committee Membership:
Dr. S. Graham
Chair
Dr. R. Mills
Member
Dr. S. Nykl
Member
AFIT-ENG-MS-18-M-069
Abstract
Securing data in transit is critically important to the Department of Defense in
todays contested environments. While encryption is often the preferred method to
provide security, there exist applications for which encryption is too resource intensive,
not cost-effective or simply not available. In this thesis, a two-channel communication
system is proposed in which the message being sent can be intelligently and dynam-
ically split over two or more channels to provide a measure of data security either
when encryption is not available, or perhaps in addition to encryption. This data
spiting technique employs multiple wireless channels operating at the physical layer,
allowing traditional layers above to run seamlessly over it.
Eight data splitting policies are developed with preliminary evaluation of their
effectiveness in combating three common cyber security threat scenarios to include
eavesdropping, jamming and man-in-the-middle attacks. These policies are then im-
plemented in a simple proof-of-concept communication system simulation. Moreover,
a framework is proposed for measuring and classifying the level of integrity, confiden-
tiality and availability that is provided by each policy. While additional discussions
present and evaluate potential packet structure, more possibilities for dynamic tun-
ability of the developed policies and any potential vulnerabilities introduced by these
data splitting schemes. Lastly, a simulation test-bed is constructed to allow for im-
plementation and testing of future policies. These data splitting techniques could
provide additional options to increase data-in-transit security for unencrypted sys-
tems operating in contested environments.
iv
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SECURING DATA IN TRANSIT USING TWO CHANNEL COMMUNICATION
I. Introduction
1.1 Introduction
The department of defense requires reliable and trusted communications capa-
bilities. Everything from battlefield radio traffic to electronic mail must be secured
using modern day network security technology. In 2012, Secretary of Defense, Leon
E. Panetta, stated that Modern armed forces cannot conduct high-tempo, effective
operations without reliable information and communication networks and assured
access to space and cyberspace. [15]
To this end, many secure communication technologies have been developed for
use in various mediums. Three of the most common communication security threats
that must be protected against are interception (eavesdropping), injection (man-in-
the middle) attacks and jamming attacks, also known as Denial of Service (DoS).
The most common solution to interception involves encryption of the data. However,
encryption alone does not overcome jamming. This paper presents a novel concept
which utilizes multiple channels to provide a secure and more reliable communications
path without the need for employing modern day encryption protocols.
1.2 Motivation
There are many situations in which military and commercial networks require a
level of secure communications, but are unwilling or unable to provide for the ad-
ditional bandwidth and processing power required for a robust industry standard
1
encryption. In these spaces, there exists the potential for multi-channel communi-
cation to provide a level of security that could be sufficient without the need for
encryption.
One such example of a military need exists in the operation of unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs), or drones. These UAVs, such as the MQ-1 Predator, provide video
surveillance feeds of the battlefield to combatant commanders for hours at a time.
That video must be transmitted from the drone which is often flying above unfriendly
or contested terrain which provides adversaries the opportunity to monitor or interfere
with these communications. In fact, in 2009, it was discovered that insurgents in Iraq
were utilizing commercial off-the-shelf hardware and software to intercept these live
video feeds from U.S. predator drones. These communication channels did not employ
encryption at the time as encryption was found to be prohibitively expensive due to
the additional hardware and bandwidth that was required. [6]
Another area of interest for the use of multi-channel communication is in remote
sensors networks that are often used in the commercial world to monitor or control
small low-power nodes. These sensors, or nodes, are often too power limited, band-
width constrained or rudimentary to justify the power and latency overhead of robust
encryption and decryption operations. Rather than employ the dedicated hardware
or power required for encryption, operators may simply leave them open to attacks
such as those described above. [14]
1.3 Problem Statement
The threat against traditional communication systems, combined with the over-
head of encryption, presents an opportunity for new and innovative electronic messag-
ing schemes in which a measure of security can be provided in conjunction with, or as a
substitute for encrypted communication. There are currently no known multi-channel
2
communication schemes that provide security through multi-channel techniques to se-
curely transmit data.
1.4 Approach
A research approach to multi-channel communications should answer some funda-
mental questions regarding the design and operation of such a system. The questions
that this research seeks to answer are as follows (Note: the number of channels has
been set at two in order to simplify analysis and presentation, but the ideas generalize
to many channels.):
1. What threat scenarios can be mitigated by splitting data among two channels?
2. What data splitting policies are most effective in mitigating these threats?
3. What measures of effectiveness can be employed to compare these policies?
4. What elements are required of a simulation framework to allow for the testing
and performance analysis of these policies?
This approach lays the groundwork for future two-channel and multi-channel ex-
perimental systems. A proof-of-concept two-channel system was created with a lim-
ited number of communication schemes referred to as policies. These policies are
used to provide solutions to the three main attack scenarios presented earlier in this
chapter: interception, jamming and data injection.
1.5 Expected Contributions
This thesis claims four contributions resulting from the questions presented in
the Approach Section 1.4 discussed earlier. These contributions are evaluated using
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the two-channel communication system discussed and evaluated in Chapter IV. By
answering these questions, this thesis seeks to make the following contributions:
1. Development of a Proof of Concept demonstrating that common threats to
data-in-transit can be at least partially mitigated by utilizing two-channel com-
munication methods.
2. At least one data-splitting technique, or policy, that can be utilized to provide
increased data-in-transit security for each of the threat scenarios presented.
3. A preliminary framework for measuring the effectiveness of the two-channel
policies tested, specifically in regards to data confidentiality, integrity and avail-
ability.
4. Proof of concept that these data-splitting policies can be utilized in a dynamic
way in which greater data confidentiality, integrity or availability can be pro-
vided on demand depending on user requirements.
1.6 Structure
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II discusses the preliminary and related
works for two-channel communication, data-in-transit security and current solutions.
Section III discusses the design and implementation methodology used to construct
a simulation of our two-channel communication system to include the policies and
packet structure employed. Chapter IV presents an analysis of the design decisions
discussed earlier in Chapter III as well as a study of the completed system simulation.
Finally, Chapter V concludes the thesis and presents a description of future work.
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II. Preliminaries and Related Works
This chapter presents information pertinent to a comprehensive understanding
of existing research into two-channel communications theory. It specifically focuses
on cyber security research that has explored the added benefits of securing data in
transit through the use of multiple communication links.
2.1 Two-Channel Communications
For the purpose of this thesis, a two-channel communication system is defined as
any pair of physical or virtual full-duplex communications links. Multiple channels
of communication allow for greater diversity in channel characteristics which may
ultimately improve the resiliency of the network against common cyber attacks. In
the case of a two-channel system, the parallel heterogeneous channels may there-
fore provide inherently greater security over a single channel, despite the increase in
system complexity. [19] For instance, in a wireless system, this diversity in channel
characteristics could refer to two parallel links operating simultaneously over different
frequencies. A common example would be an 802.11 wireless access point operating on
both the 2.4GHz and 5GHz frequency bands. Although employing similar protocols
on both bands, the separation in frequency affords greater resiliency to any one type
of cyber attack. Additionally, other tactics such as data randomization, deception
and adaptive management and response can be employed using two-channel commu-
nication to create transformational improvements which increase the adversaries cost
and uncertainty, ultimately leading to fewer attacks. [5]
Communications over parallel links is generally implemented for the purpose of
redundancy or to improve signal reception and throughput. For example, cell-phone
modems and Wi-Fi connected devices take advantage of parallel channels by utilizing
5
a technology called Multiple Input, Multiple Output (MIMO). Using this technology,
multiple physical antennas are used to connect to the cell tower or wireless access
point. MIMO can improve throughput and the signal-to-noise ratio. However, in
addition to these proven performance gains, there exists the potential for increased
data security. This security improvement can be realized by splitting the data across
these parallel channels. In this way, it may be possible to thwart various types of
attacks against data-in-transit even when other defenses, such as encryption, are not
available.[1]
Figure 1 shows a simple two-channel communication system in which the sender,
Alice, utilizes a splitter to divide and send data over two links before it is recombined
at Bob’s end.
Figure 1. Simple Two-Channel Communication System
2.2 Threats to Data in Transit
This section analyzes the current data-in-transit threat environment. It does not
attempt to present all threats to data-in-transit, rather it focuses on presenting only
threat information required to fully understand the two-channel solutions presented
later in this chapter and the threat scenarios studied later in this thesis.
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2.2.1 Interception or Eavesdropping Attack.
Eavesdropping, interchangeably used with interception in this thesis, is the act of
passively intercepting private communications between two parties for the purpose
of understanding what is being communicated. It violates the confidentiality of the
communications. In the classic computer security model, an eavesdropper, referred
to as ’Eve’, is the party intercepting communications between ’Alice’ and ’Bob’ as
shown in Figure 2. [16]
Figure 2. Eavesdropper Attack
In this model, Eve is assumed to have gained access to the communication path
between Alice and Bob. In the real-world, Eve could represent another user in-range
of a wireless network being used for communication or a user plugged into the same
network hub being used to transmit the data in question. For example, an enemy
combatant passively intercepting a video feed that is being transmitted in the clear
by a military drone, would be considered an eavesdropper.
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2.2.2 Jamming Attack.
A jamming event is a type of denial-of-service attack against a wireless medium
such as a radio receiver. The goal of this attack is to block communication by im-
pending a target sensors ability to send or receive signals. There are many types of
jamming attacks, but this thesis will only discuss the ’constant jammer’ model. In
this model, the attacker continually emits a signal consisting of random bits which
either overpowers or interferes with the legitimate signal at the receiver. When this
attack is active, the receiving party cannot decipher the legitimate message being
sent by the sender. Figure 3 shows a simple example of a jamming attack targeting
the Bob’s receiver. [17]
Figure 3. Jamming Attack
2.2.3 Man-in-the-Middle Attack.
The MITM attack (A.K.A monkey-in-the-middle) is similar in nature to the eaves-
dropper attack presented in Section 2.2.1. However, in this case the attacker is placed
between the sender and receiver. Therefore the attacker can not only snoop on traffic,
but can also alter traffic before it is seen by the intended recipient. This alteration
could include removing a portion of the data, adding data or changing the data in
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order to mislead the receiver. Because of the active nature of this attack, the MITM
violates both the confidentiality and integrity of the communications. Like the eaves-
dropper attack, the MITM attack requires the attacker to have access to some portion
of the communication path. Figure 4 shows the attacker in-line with Alice and Bob,
giving them full access to any communications sent along that path.
Figure 4. Man-in-the-Middle Attack
It is worth nothing that MITM attacks have become more common with the ad-
vent of wireless communications, which are particularly susceptible to eavesdropping
because of the broadcast nature of the transmission medium.[3]
2.3 CIA Triad
The Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) triad is a model used to
guide information security policies. These elements are considered the most crucial
components of data security, and therefore information owners must consider them
before deciding how best to transmit data. In short, confidentiality involves protect-
ing the contents of the data, integrity ensures the data is unaltered and availability
describes the reliability of data access afforded to authorized users. [8]
Additionally, these elements are key metrics to quantifying the overall security
posture of a network or communication’s link. Often users cannot maximize each of
these characteristics without introducing trade-offs that affect the others. Decisions
makers must balance the level of each attribute with the mission requirements in
9
order to achieve the desired result. This thesis will focus on the additional CIA
related security opportunities provided to the user as a result of the diversity offered
by the addition of a second parallel communications channel. [7]
2.3.1 Confidentiality.
Confidentiality involves protecting data from unauthorized users. It can also be
described as information privacy or secrecy. In other words, confidentiality is the
measure to which data remains unavailable to eavesdroppers. In order to guarantee
confidentiality of data, most modern-day communications utilize encryption. If a
sufficiently robust encryption is indeed used, the sender can be confident that an
eavesdropper cannot decrypt the data, thus ensuring confidentiality. [8]
In a two-channel system where only one channel is compromised and encryp-
tion cannot be used, confidentiality can be obtained to a varying degree by splitting
the data between the available channels. The algorithm used to split the data will
determine the level of confidentiality that is achieved. In the encryption world, con-
fidentiality can be measured by the type of encryption scheme utilized and the time
it would take for an attacker to brute-force the decryption key. However, no corre-
sponding model exists for two-channel systems. This paper will attempt to create a
scheme which will enable comparison of the confidentiality associated with various
data splitting schemes.
2.3.2 Integrity.
Integrity is the measure of the consistency, accuracy and trustworthiness of the
data transmitted over the link. In other words, integrity ensures the data has not
been altered between the sender and receiver. To accomplish this, typically an error
checking scheme is utilized, such as a checksum or cryptographic hash function. How-
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ever, this process is only designed to detect transmission errors or data corruption,
as opposed to a sophisticated MITM attack. An attacker could defeat the integrity
check by simply updating the checksum to ensure the altered data appeared legiti-
mate. Of course, encryption can help ensure integrity, since the attacker would have
to be able to decrypt the data in order to properly modify the contents. [8]
In some scenarios a user may find the encryption overhead unacceptable or may be
worried that a MITM attacker could craft fake packets utilizing the receivers public
key. In these cases, a two-channel system could also be leveraged to ensure data
integrity by utilizing splitting algorithms or by passing the checksum over the second,
non-compromised channel. An analog to this is the use of two-factor authentication,
though this use case is not explicitly explored in this thesis.
2.3.3 Availability.
Availability is the measure of reliable data access provided to users. In other
words, availability ensures that the information can be readily accessed when re-
quested. Typically, availability is more closely associated with network management
than network security, however it plays a vital role in the CIA triad since data must
be available for it to be of any value. In general, good network management practices
are utilized to ensure data availability. This includes utilizing redundant back-ups,
ensuring sufficient bandwidth and mitigating denial of service attacks, just to name
a few. [8]
With a two-channel system, users can apply the same principles as explained in
the MIMO discussion to increase throughput, and therefore availability, by transmit-
ting data over both channels. This type of transmission would theoretically reduce
confidentiality and integrity, since an attacker would only have to compromise one
channel to obtain all the data. However, by fully utilizing both channels, the sender
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would maximize availability.
2.4 Current Solutions
Protecting data in transit from eavesdroppers or MITM attacks is traditionally
achieved through the use of encryption. Encryption ensures that only the intended
recipient can decrypt the data. This means that even if Eve intercepts the data, she
cannot make sense of the data unless she possesses the proper tools for decryption.
These typically include knowledge of the encryption scheme and the actual decryption
keys.
The Internet makes heavy use of encryption to protect data confidentiality. For
instance, most modern websites handling sensitive data utilize the Hyper Text Trans-
fer Protocol Secure (HTTPS). HTTPS in turn uses a robust asymmetric Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) system to ensure only the intended receiver can decrypt the
message.
2.4.1 The Cost of Encryption.
Despite the advantages offered by encryption, there are trade-offs in the form of
additional overhead costs such as infrastructure requirements, communication latency,
bandwidth and energy consumption. For instance, a typical HTTPS web session will
require more time and processing power than an equivalent, non-encrypted HTTP
session. This is because calculating encryption keys, encrypting data and decrypting
data all require additional computational time and power. Likewise, encrypted data
takes up more space than its non-encrypted form, requiring more time and resources
to transmit the data. All of the trade-offs mentioned become more cumbersome as
the robustness of the encryption is increased, which is typically accomplished by
increasing the key length. [13] Lastly, encryption does not protect the data from
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being intercepted, rather it only attempts to protect the confidentiality of the data
by utilizing a proven encryption scheme. For this reason, it is still possible that
an eavesdropper could decrypt the data at some point in the future by leveraging
advances in computing power or currently unknown vulnerabilities in the encryption
scheme.
2.4.2 Encryption in Low-powered Devices.
In applications where processing power and bandwidth are readily available, these
overheads may be of little concern. However, in scenarios where these resources are
limited, encryption can be a costly endeavor.
For instance, in small low-powered devices, such as those used in networks of
remote sensors, the additional computational resources required for robust encryption
may consume more time and power than is acceptable.
A sensor network refers to a system of small sensors each containing a general-
purpose computing element. Networks such as these are used in numerous industries
to monitor conditions or control equipment in remote locations. They often consist
of a large number of low-powered devices designed to conserve battery life while
communicating critical information over wireless links [9].
Because these wireless sensor networks typically have limited computational and
power resources available, modern encryption standards, such as 128-bit advanced
encryption standard (AES), can impose a significant burden on the individual nodes.
For example, one study found that using 128-bit AES to encrypt one 128-bit block of
data takes 1.1 milliseconds (ms), 946 bytes of random access memory and 23.57 mi-
crojoules (J) on a IEEE/ZigBee 802.15.4 board commonly used in low-power wireless
sensor networks [18]. These resources add up quickly as more data is transmitted over
the lifespan of the sensor. Equation 1 shows that after encrypting one gigabyte (GB)
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worth of data, the sensor will have expended 0.41 watt-hours (Wh) of energy solely
to encrypt the data being sent. This can significantly affect battery life in devices
which may only have a few watt-hours of energy.
1GB × 8bits
1Byte
× 23.57J
128bits
× 1Wh
3600J
= 0.41Wh (1)
Light-weight encryption schemes, such as the SIMON and SPECK encryption
ciphers, attempt to solve this issue in low-powered devices by offering more efficient,
but less robust encryption options [2]. However, no encryption scheme can reduce the
overhead completely. Using two-channel communication, this paper will show that a
level of data confidentiality and integrity can be provided without the added overhead
of encryption.
2.5 Tunable Security
Tunable security is a security service designed to offer various security configura-
tions that can be selected at run-time. For a security service to be tunable, it must
offer at least two security configurations. For instance, when using encryption, a tun-
able security service might allow a user to select various encryption schemes or key
lengths depending on user preference. This would allow the user to tune the service
to utilize a more robust encryption when high-security is desired or use a less secure
encryption scheme when transmitting data in a low-threat environment. [11]
In the context of this thesis, tunable security will be used to provide the sender
multiple methods for securing data in-transit. This will be accomplished by taking
advantage of two-channel communication as opposed to more traditional, but compu-
tationally expensive methods, such as encryption. Furthermore, the tunable nature
of the security service will be achieved by offering multiple options in the form of
various algorithms used to determine which bits are transferred over which channels.
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In this way, the user can make trade-offs between the elements of the CIA triad in
order to match the mission requirements. For instance, in an untrusted environment,
the user could tune the system in order to maximize confidentiality, while in a trusted
location one could tune the system to ensure better data availability. These tuning
actions will be achieved by altering the complexity and behavior of the data splitting
algorithm to best match the desired characteristics.
2.6 Cyclic Redundancy Checks
A Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) is a common method used in digital networks
to detect bit errors in data transmission or data storage. Use of a CRC in data
transmission is typically intended only to provide a defense against data corruption.
However, as we will show later in this paper, the CRC can also be utilized along with
the two-channel system to help detect potential MITM attacks.
For data transmission, error detection is accomplished by first calculating a binary
CRC code using the message to be sent and the CRC polynomial specific to whichever
CRC algorithm the user chooses. The resulting code is then appended to the end of
the message to be sent. Once delivered, the receiver performs the same calculations
and compares the result to the appended CRC code. If the results do not match, the
receiver knows there was an error in transmission and can request a retransmission.
However, if the CRC codes match, the receiver has some level of confidence that the
message was not corrupted in transmission.
CRCs vary in length and complexity. Longer CRCs are generally able to detect a
higher number of bit errors. The minimum possible number of bit errors that must
be injected into the message in order to escape detection by the CRC is referred to
as the hamming distance. For example, a CRC with a hamming distance of 4-bits
provides error detection for any combination of 1-, 2-, or 3-bit flips resulting from
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transmission error. However, there is at least one combination of 4-bit errors that
remain undetectable to the CRC. For this thesis, an 8-bit CRC with a hamming
distance of 4-bits will be used in conjunction with the two-channel system and is
discussed further in Section 3.6.1 [10].
Another technique commonly used in wireless communication is Forward Error
Correction (FEC), employed to overcome noise in a transmission medium. FEC may
also be employed across multiple channels as a means to detect injection attacks
without alerting the MITM attacker. This will be briefly discussed later.
2.7 Chapter Summary
Traditional methods of securing data-in-transit rely on the use of robust encryp-
tion. While effective, this technique can be expensive from a computational and
bandwidth perspective.
Through the use of a two-channel system, data-in-transit can be secured to varying
degrees by splitting the data across both channels. Additionally, the user can tune
the level of security by altering the splitting algorithm at run-time in order to match
the desired characteristics of the CIA triad.
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III. Design and Implementation Methodology
3.1 Objective
The intent of this research is to demonstrate two-channel communication policies
that can be employed to improve data-in-transit security. To accomplish this, multiple
two-channel communication policies will be developed, simulated and analyzed for
effectiveness in various threat scenarios. The results will be used to categorize the
advantages and disadvantages of each data splitting policy so that a tunable system
can be created to address a fluid threat environment such as those faced by UAVs.
3.2 Assumptions and Constraints
Many of the assumptions arise because this work is conducted in a purely sim-
ulated environment which lacks many of the variables and other real-world aspects
associated with experimentation. The assumptions and constraints are listed as fol-
lows:
• There are exactly two channels capable of equal data rates available. (We
are not exploring the concept of passing a key over a low-bandwidth channel).
Additionally, these concepts may be applied to n-channels, but we will stick
with two channels for simplicity.
• Only one of the two channels may be compromised. The user knows and/or
suspects which communication channel may be susceptible to compromise. We
will not explore the case in which both channels are compromised, as it would
be similar in nature to attack scenarios in which only one channel is available.
• Real-world communication challenges such as channel timing and signal quality
are assumed to be non-issues in order to allow a greater focus on the analysis
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of the communication policies themselves.
3.3 Design Decisions
There are a number of different approaches which can be utilized to achieve the
objectives listed above. One approach is to perform a strictly analytic assessment
which would examine the theoretical aspect of the two-channel communication sys-
tem. While this approach requires the least amount of time and resources, it is the
least accurate. Another approach is to simulate the two-channel system using soft-
ware to emulate all nodes and messages traversing the system. This approach requires
more time and resources than the theoretical method, but provides more tangible re-
sults in the end. A third approach would consist of actually building out the system
in hardware so that the performance could be measured using real-world components
operating representative environments. This approach, while the most realistic, is
also the most time and resource intensive and least flexible.
This thesis will use the second approach in order to simulate the two-channel
system in software. This approach was chosen because it provides the flexibility to
quickly simulate and analyze different communication policies while providing more
realistic results than a simply theoretical study. Ultimately, the results of these
simulations could provide the basis for the construction of a real-world system using
actual hardware components operating over different frequencies.
The flowchart shown in Figure 5 below lists the overarching steps taken to un-
timely achieve a dynamically tunable two-channel communication system. We begin
by defining the threat scenarios that will help determine the data-in-transit security
requirements. These requirements inform the mitigation techniques that are then
refined into data splitting policies designed to take advantage of the two channels
available to us. Once the policies have been defined, they are simulated in software
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and the results are used to classify their effectiveness and suitability for tuning. Fi-
nally, the results are used to build a taxonomy of tunable two-channel communication
policies designed to combat the various threat scenarios.
Figure 5. Methodology Flowchart
Of course, the choice to simulate the environment introduces some constraints.
Notably, the results of this study will only be as useful as the software used to simulate
it. For this reason, the industry standard OMNeT++ software will be used to create
the system and provide statistics.
3.4 Scenarios
The following three attack scenarios represent the threat environments applicable
to data-in-transit that will be studied in this Thesis.
3.4.1 Eavesdropper.
In this scenario, one channel may be compromised by an eavesdropper. The
objective of this scenario will be to maximize confidentiality by minimizing the number
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of bits that are intercepted and known by the eavesdropper. The compromised channel
may or may not be known.
The flowchart in Figure 6 below shows the adversary’s steps during a typical
eavesdrop attack on one channel of the communications system.
Figure 6. Eavesdropper Attack
This attack methodology was used to develop the three mitigation techniques
shown below.
1. Do not send all data on compromised channel.
Result: Limits the eavesdropper to only partial data, that which is sent over
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the compromised channel.
2. Send no data over compromised channel.
Result: Eavesdropper has no data. But eavesdropper may be suspicious and
search for more frequencies if no data is being sent. Data rate is cut in half.
3. Send faux data over compromised channel. Real data over uncompromised
channel.
Result: Eavesdropper has only worthless or misleading data. Data rate is cut
in half.
3.4.2 Jamming/Denial of Service.
In this scenario, one channel may become unusable for some period of time due
to a jamming or DoS attack. The objective in this scenario is to maximize data
availability despite losing the use of one of the channels temporarily or permanently.
The flowchart in Figure 7 below shows the adversary’s steps during a typical
jamming/DoS attack on one channel of the communications system.
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Figure 7. Jamming/Denial of Service Attack
This attack methodology was used to develop the three mitigation techniques
shown below.
1. Do not send any data on the jammed channel at any time.
Result: Jammer may be unaware that any communications are taking place
since no activity is observed on the affected channel. Data rate is cut in half
since data can only be sent on one channel.
2. Send data over compromised channel until jamming event is detected. Then
send data only over the undetected channel.
22
Result: Jammer sees data on compromised channel before jamming. Executes
jamming attack and believes communication to have been denied.
3. Send data over compromised channel until jamming event is detected. Then
send data only over the undetected channel. Retry sending data on the jammed
channel on a preset schedule to once again take advantage of the compromised
channels bandwidth once the jamming event has ended.
Result: Jammer sees data on compromised channel before jamming. Executes
jamming attack and believes communication to have been denied. However,
communication resumes at some point after jamming ceases or becomes ineffec-
tive.
3.4.3 Man-in-the-Middle.
In this scenario, one of the channels may be susceptible to a man-in-the-middle
attack in which the data-in-transit has been modified. The objective is for the system
to maximize data integrity by utilizing the two-channels to detect the attack and
mitigate the effects.
The flowchart in Figure 8 below shows the adversary’s steps during a typical
MITM attack on one channel of the communications system.
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Figure 8. Man-in-the-Middle Attack
This attack methodology was used to develop the two mitigation techniques shown
below.
1. Utilize Data CRC in order to detect when data has been modified on one chan-
nel. Once attack is detected, cease data transfer over compromised channel.
Transfer all data over safe channel.
Result: MITM will be unable to modify data undetected. However, they may
become suspicious if the data flow stops once the MITM attack begins. Addi-
tionally, throughput is reduced as only one channel can be used.
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2. Utilize Data CRC in order to detect when data has been modified on one chan-
nel. Once attack is detected, switch to transferring only fake data over the
compromised channel. Transfer real data over the safe channel only.
Result: MITM will be unable to modify data undetected. Additionally, they
may be unaware their attack has been detected if they continue to see data
flowing over the compromised channel. However, throughput is reduced as only
one channel can be used.
3.5 Policies
For simulation purposes, eight policies were created to correspond to the eight
mitigation strategies that were introduced in the previous sub-section. These policies
govern the way in which the data bits are divided among the two-channels. Each
policy is presented in Table 1 and described in detail below.
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Table 1. Data Splitting Policies
Scenario Policy # Description
Eavesdropper
0 Split data over both channels.
1 Send data only over safe channel.
2 Send real data over safe channel. & fake data over compro-
mised channel.
DoS/Jamming
3 Do not send data on channel susceptible to compromise.
4 Send data on both channels until jamming is detected, then
limit to safe channel.
5 Send data on both channels until DoS is detected, then limit
to safe channel. Periodically retry sending on jammed chan-
nel.
MITM
6 Detect data modification w/data-CRC. Once detected,
transfer data only over safe channel.
7 Detect data modification with data-CRC. Once detected,
transfer real data only over safe channel & fake data over
compromised channel.
The Eavesdropper policies are meant to thwart an attacker who has the ability
to observe one channel. The three policies listed provide options to prevent the
eavesdropper from obtaining 100% of the data communicated. The first policy ensures
only a portion of the data is sent on the compromised channel. The proportion of
data sent across this channel can be specified by the user. The type of data may be
used to determine the acceptable amount of data compromise that is possible while
still maintaining the appropriate degree of confidentiality. The second policy simply
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avoids sending data over the possibly compromised channel. While the third policy
is similar to the second except that it also provides for sending fake data over the
compromised channel. The fake data could provide the eavesdropper with a false
sense of success in their attempt to intercept the communications.
The three policies designed to counteract the DoS attack provide options for cir-
cumventing the jammed channel. Policy Three simply avoids using the channel sus-
ceptible channel all together. Policy 4 operates in a split data mode similar to Policy
0 until a jamming event is detected at which point all data transmission is limited to
the safe channel. Policy 5 is similar to Policy 4 except that it intermittently checks the
status of the jammed channel and will resume the Policy 0 behavior if it determines
the channel is no longer jammed.
The final two policies are designed to detect and thwart MITM attacks. Policy
6 and 7 utilize a cyclic redundancy check which is calculated using 16-bits of data
before splitting the data into two 8-bit chunks for transmission across the medium.
Modification of the data results in a different CRC being calculated by the assembler
which triggers detection of the attack. Policy 6 simply refrains from transferring over
the suspect channel after detection of a MITM attack while policy 7 does much of
the same with the addition of transferring phony data over the compromised channel
for the purpose of deception.
3.6 Packet Structure
For simulation purposes, a rudimentary packet structure was created which could
meet the needs of the policies presented in the previous section. The packet structure
is shown in Figure 9 and the individual fields are discussed below.
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Figure 9. Simulation Packet Structure
1. Policy - This 3-bit field is used to specify the policy being used to send the
corresponding packet. The policy numbers match those presented in the Section
3.5. (i.e. a binary ’101’ in this field would represent Policy 5. The assembler
uses this field to ensure corresponding packets contain matching policy number
before processing them.
2. MessageX - This 8-bit field contains the data bits.
3. CRC-DataX - This 4-bit field contains the data level CRC for policies requiring
detection of MITM attacks (i.e. policies 6 & 7). For all other policies, this field
is used to transmit an additional 4-bits of data.
4. Pkt # - This 3-bit field is used to record the packet number. Packets being
sent over either channel will have a matching packet containing an identical
packet number sent over the opposite channel. These packet numbers are used
to ensure similar packets are processed together by the assembler according to
their policy.
5. CRC-Msg# - This 8-bit field is used for error detection during message trans-
mission. The CRC corresponds to the entire packet and is checked for correct-
ness by the assembler upon arrival.
It should be noted that these packets are representative of data being transmitted
a the physical layer of the Open Systems Interconnection model. This allows for
normal network traffic (i.e. Transmission Control Protocol, Internet Protocol) to ride
on top of the two-channel system.
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3.6.1 CRC Description.
The CRC chosen for use in the simulation packet design was the 8-bit long CRC-8
polynomial represented by the hex value 0xEA. This polynomial was chosen because it
provides a hamming distance of 4-bits for messages up to 85-bits in length while only
adding a relatively short 8-bits of information to the packet. Therefore, it provided a
good balance between length and performance. This CRC scheme was employed for
both the message and data CRC for simulation simplicity although different CRCs
could be utilized for each of these fields. The CRC-8 scheme is also commonly used
in commercial communication technologies such as the Digital Video Broadcasting
satellite second generation standard and is well understood.[10]
3.7 Policy Comparison Framework
3.7.1 CIA Attributes - Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The policies can be compared to each other based on the three CIA attributes de-
scribed in Section 2.3.1. The framework used to compare them is a modified subset of
the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) v2.0 normally
used to assess the severity of computer system security vulnerabilities. As part of
assessing vulnerabilities, the CVSS assess CIA attributes as impact metrics and uses
a three-tiered scale consisting of Complete (C), Partial (P) and None (N). Where (C)
corresponds to a complete loss of an attribute, (P) represents a partial loss of the
attribute and (N) refers to no loss. [4]
For the purpose of this thesis, policy comparison between the CIA attributes of
the various policies presented will consist of (C) for a complete loss and (N) for no
loss. While a partial loss of an attribute will be represented by a numeric value
between 1 and 99 which corresponds to the percentage of the resource lost. For
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instance, if a policy is found to provide 100% confidentiality in a given scenario,
an (N) is used to represent that there is no loss of confidentiality. Likewise, a (C)
for integrity represents a complete loss. Finally, a numeric value in either integrity
or confidentiality represents the percentage of the message which was compromised.
While a numeric availability value represents the percentage of throughput which was
lost in relation to the maximum provided by Policy 0.
3.8 Software
1. Windows 10 - An industry standard Operating System to support all other
software described below.
2. OMNeT++ v5.2.1 - This was the software used to simulate the two-channel
system. OMNeT++ is a discrete event simulator which utilizes a C++ based
library built specifically for network simulation. OMNeT++ provides for the
ability to create and configure models, perform batch executions and analyze
simulation results.
3. OMNeT++ IDE - The OMNeT++ Integrated Development Environment is
based on the eclipse platform and was used to code the simulation in C++.
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IV. Simulation and Analysis
4.1 Introduction
Using OMNeT++, the seven policies presented in Chapter 3 were simulated in
software. These policies were then compared using their measured throughput. Addi-
tionally, these policies were examined for potential effectiveness and vulnerabilities.
4.2 Simulation Design
The simulation was programmed using C++ and consisted of six main compo-
nents. Figure 10 shows each of these components parts connected in a two-channel
system used in the simulation environment.
Figure 10. Two-Channel Simulation Structure in OMNeT++
The individual components that comprise the simulation scenario are defined in
more detail below.
4.2.1 Component Descriptions.
1. Alice - The Alice module represents the sending party and provides the bits to
be transmitted. This simulates the message that needs to be communicated to
the receiving party, Bob.
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2. Splitter - The Splitter module is where the data splitting logic is implemented.
It is here that decisions on which data to send over channel A or B are made
based on the user input provide.
3. Transmitter “TX# ” - The two transmitter modules represent the physical
transmitters that send data over each of the channels.
4. Receiver “RX# ” - The two receiver modules represent the physical receivers
that receive data over each of the channels.
5. Assembler - The Assembler module executes logic much in the same manner
as the Splitter module, in that it must assemble the message after transmission
and according to the policy being used.
6. Bob - The Bob module represents the receiving party and ultimately receives
the message being transmitted after it is assembled in the Assembler module.
4.2.2 User Input.
The user provides a plain-text message to be transmitted from Alice to Bob. This
plain-text message is then converted into American Standard Code for Information
Interchange (ASCII) bits by the program and transmitted according to the user spec-
ified policy. The user specifies this policy by entering a number between 0 and 7
before program execution. This number corresponds to the policy number shown in
Table 1.
4.2.3 Simulation Operation.
The OMNeT++ simulation begins with the Alice block. This block reads in data
from the input text file, described in Section 4.2.2, one character at a time. It then
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converts the ASCII character to binary and passes the binary string bit-by-bit to the
Splitter.
The Splitter reads-in the policy number being simulated from a the text file set
by the user. It then buffers data from Alice until enough data is received to transmit.
The number of bits required for transmission depends on the policy being simulated.
The Splitter will then load the data into 26-bit message buffers based on the set
policy. Once the data bits are set, the Splitter will set the policy bits, packet number
bits and calculate the CRC-Msg bits using the CRC-8 scheme discussed in Section
3.6.1. For some policies, the Splitter creates a packet for each channel and sets a
matching packet number in each message that will be used by the Assembler to verify
the pair of packets correspond to one another. For other policies, where only one
channel is in use, the Splitter only creates one packet to send over a single channel.
Once the packets are created, the Splitter passes the messages to the TX blocks
to be sent across the simulated channel. The TX block then transmits the message
bit by bit across the simulated delay channel to the corresponding RX block. The
splitter also stores a copy of the packet(s) in-case a retransmission is requested by
the Assembler.
Once the packet is received by the RX block, it is passed ot the Assembler which
buffers the bits until an entire packets is received. Once received, the Assembler checks
for transmission errors by calculating the packet’s CRC-Msg bits and comparing them
to the bits received. If the bits do not match, the Assembler sends the Splitter a single
one bit to request a re-transmission of the packet. However, if the CRC-Msg bits do
match, the Assembler replies with a zero-bit acknowledgment on the corresponding
channel. The Splitter will wait to send the next packet(s) or retransmit the last
packet until it receives the acknowledgment from the Assembler.
Finally, the Assembler will process the successfully transmitted packet(s), accord-
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ing to the policy identified by their set policy field bits, in order to extract the included
data. The program then turns the received data bits into their corresponding ASCII
letters and prints the final message to the screen.
4.2.4 Simulation Output.
The simulation outputs multiple text files to the directory of choice for later
analysis. These text files include a record of data sent over each channel as seen by
each of the blocks identified in Figure 10. Additionally, the Splitter and Assembler
blocks also output key system messages such as acknowledgments, re-transmission
requests and state transitions to the OMNeT++ terminal for use in debugging and
tracking behavior. Finally, the assembler also outputs the received message packets
along with the associated in ASCII characters and timestamps used for calculating
throughput.
4.2.5 Simulated Policy Behaviors.
The following subsections describe the test policies programmed behaviors in more
depth.
4.2.5.1 Policy 0.
In Policy 0 the sender transmits data across both channels in a 50/50 split. The
first byte of data is stored in the Message A field and the second byte of data is sent in
the MessageB field. An additional third byte of data is split evenly across the CRC-
DataA and CRC-DataB fields. In the case of Policy 0, the CRC-Data fields are utilized
for data transmission rather than storing of the CRC information. This is possible
because the data level CRC is not required for any policies except those designed to
counteract the MITM scenario. Rather than changing the packet structure on a per
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policy basis or letting the CRC-Data field go unused, it is re-purposed for additional
data throughput. In this way, the bit-rate of this policy is increased by 50% since
each packet can transmit 12-bits of data versus 8-bits otherwise.
4.2.5.2 Policy 1.
Policy 1 follows the same structure as Policy 0, however it limits packet trans-
mission to channel A, which is assumed to be the safe channel in the simulation.
Therefore, the first byte is stored in channel A’s MessageA field and the first half of
the second byte is stored in the CRC-DataA field. NO packets are sent across channel
B.
4.2.5.3 Policy 2.
Policy 2 is similar to Policy 1 in that it sends data over the safe channel A.
However, random data is also sent by the program over the compromised channel B
in order to deceive the eavesdropper. The Assembler simply ignores the data received
over channel B when Policy 2 is specified.
4.2.5.4 Policy 3.
Policy 3 was designed to be the safe counter to a possible jamming event on the
susceptible channel B. However, it is the same as Policy 1 in practice since it only
sends data over the safe channel A.
4.2.5.5 Policy 4.
Policy 4 reacts to a simulated attack by ceasing data transmission over channel B
once a jamming event is detected. The simulated jamming event is characterized by
the receiver failing to receive packet on three successive attempts. Once the Splitter
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receives the third successive retransmission request from the Assembler, it reverts to
sending data over the single non-jammed channel. In other words, the system resorts
to Policy 3 in order to complete the simulation after a jamming event is detected.
4.2.5.6 Policy 5.
Policy 5 behaves in a similar manner to Policy 4 except that it periodically re-
tries sending on the jammed channel. After a jamming event is detected, the policy
reverts to the behavior of Policy 3 as in the above. However, after a preset number
of successful transmissions over the safe channel, the system attempts to transmit
again over the jammed channel. For simulation purposes, the system will attempt to
retransmit on the jammed channel after 10 and 30 successful packets sent over the
clear channel. If transmission over the jammed channel proves successful on any of
the first three attempts, the system will resort to its original state and continue to
the transfer over both channels until another jamming event is detected. Figure 11
shows a simple state diagram to illustrate the programmed behavior of Policy 5. The
’FailCounter’ variable is used to track the number of failed transmission attempts
while the ’Counter’ variable is used to track the number of successful one-channel
transmissions.
Figure 11. Policy 5 State Diagram
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4.2.5.7 Policy 6.
Policy 6 is programmed to send data over both channels like in Policy 0. However,
the policy also utilizes the CRC-8 scheme to create the data CRC bits to fill the CRC-
DataA and CRC-DataB packet fields. This is done by generating an 8-bit CRC using
the 16-bits of data (MessageA + MessageB) as an input. Then placing the first 4-bits
of that CRC into the CRC-DataA field and the last 4-bits into the CRC-DataB field.
On the receiving end, the assembler performs the same operation using the 16-bits
of received data as the input. The assembler then compares the resultant CRC bits
to the received CRC bits to determine if there are any differences. Since only one
channel is susceptible to manipulation, an attacker could not modify the half of the
data CRC sent on the safe channel and therefore any changes to the data should
result in a different data CRC. If this occurs, the assembler assumes a MITM attack
has occurred and requests retransmission on both channels. If the assembler receives
three retransmission requests in a row on both channels, it will resort to sending data
only on the safe channel for the remainder of the simulation, similar to Policy 1.
4.2.5.8 Policy 7.
Policy 7 operates in much the same way as Policy 6. However, once the MITM
attack has been detected, the system transitions to the behavior of Policy 2 in that
random data is also sent over the compromised channel for the remainder of the
simulation in order to deceive the attacker.
4.2.6 Simulating Attacks.
For each of the policies listed in Section 4.2.5, there exist a corresponding attack
matching the threat scenario shown in Table 1. These attacks are programmed into
each policy’s OMNeT++ function and can be enabled by changing a switch in the
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code. Additionally, attacks such as jamming can be tunned to occur more often or
for longer durations. The program will also output status update messages to the
terminal when the attacks are taking place and when the policies detect an attack
occurring.
4.3 Policy Comparison
4.3.1 Eavesdropper Scenario.
The three policies developed to counter the eavesdropper attack are compared
in Table 2 using the subset of the CVSS framework discussed above. Note that the
eavesdropping attack targets only the confidentiality of the communications. In Policy
0, there is a partial loss of confidentiality of the transmission because the attacker
will intercept all of the data sent across the tapped channel. However, policies 1
and 2 have no impact to confidentiality because the data is sent over only the safe
channel. The trade-off for limiting data to the safe channel can be seen in the effect
on availability as 50% of the throughput is lost when limiting transmissions to just
one channel. Integrity is not affected in this scenario since the adversary is limited
to eavesdropping.
Table 2. Impact Scores for Eavesdropper Policies (Critical Info)
Policy Description C I A
0 Split data over both channels. 50% N N
1 Send data only over safe channel. N N 50%
2 Send real data over safe channel & fake data over compro-
mised channel.
N N 50%
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The comparison presented in Table 2 can be used to determine the best policy
choice given the data protection requirements. For data that is confidential in nature,
it may be preferable to utilize Policy 1 or 2. Whereas Policy 0 would be the best
choice for less critical data or in cases where throughput is valued over confidentiality.
4.3.2 DoS/Jamming Scenario.
The three policies developed to counter the jamming attack are compared in Ta-
ble 3. Since the jamming scenario incorporates the eavesdropper and jamming attacks,
trade-offs can be seen between both the confidentiality and availability. Integrity re-
mains unchanged since the adversary is not capable of MITM attacks in this scenario.
Policy 3 ensures no impact to confidentiality and integrity but sacrifices availability
in the form of throughput just as with Policy 1 and 2. Policy 4 and 5 act in different
manners depending on the state of the attack. Before the jamming event is detected,
the policies operate over both channels and therefore there is no negative impact to
throughput, however confidentiality is still impacted since the adversary could poten-
tially eavesdrop on the tapped channel. Once the system detects a jamming event,
Policy 4 switches modes to cease transmissions over the jammed channel. This results
in an impact to the availability by cutting the throughput in half. Policy 5 initially
reacts in the same manner, however it has the potential to resort to the previous state
when the jamming event is no longer detected. It attempts to send a packet on the
jammed channel at user specified intervals. If successful, the policy reverts back to
it’s pre-attack state until another attack is detected.
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Table 3. Impact Scores for DoS/Jamming Policies
Pre-Attack Post-Attack
Policy Description
C I A C I A
3 Do not send data on channel sus-
ceptible to compromise.
N N 50% No Change
4 Send data on both channels until
jamming is detected, then limit to
safe channel.
50% N N N N 50%
5 Send data on both channels un-
til jamming is detected, then limit
to safe channel. Periodically retry
sending on jammed channel.
50% N N N N 50%
The simulation output also allows us to visualize the policy’s throughput in respect
to one another. The major difference in the throughput of the jamming policies is
found in comparing Policy 4 and 5. Policy 4 reverts to using one channel for the
remainder of the simulation once a jamming event has been detected. This reduces
the throughput by half. Policy 5 behaves in much the same way except it will attempt
to re-send over the jammed channel after a period of time. This gives Policy 5 the
potential to re-acquire some of it’s lost throughput after the jamming attack has
ceased.
Figure 12 shows a comparison of policies 4 and 5 in a jamming scenario in which
there are two main jamming events. The plot was obtained by graphing the OM-
NeT++ simulation output timestamps using Microsoft Excel c©. It compares the
number of bytes successfully transmitted and their timestamps to show which pol-
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icy is achieving a greater throughput. As can be seen from the graph, both policies
react to the initial jamming even, represented by the two vertically shaded areas,
by switching to one-channel transmission and thus reducing their throughput. How-
ever, Policy 5 is programmed to re-attempt transmission on the jammed channel after
transmitting 10 packets using only the safe channel and again after 30 packets. Since
the first jamming event is relatively short, the initial attempt to re-utilize the previ-
ously jammed channel proves successful and Policy 5 begins to re-use second channel,
increasing it’s throughput. Another jamming event strikes at around 100 seconds
of simulation time and lasts for just over 30 seconds. In this case, the policy again
attempts to re-transmit over the jammed channel after 10 packets and finds that it
is still jammed. It then reverts to sending over only the safe channel for another 20
packets before ultimately attempting to use channel B again. On the second attempt,
it is successful and begins transmitting at the higher rater once more.
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Figure 12. Jamming Scenario Throughput Comparison
4.3.3 MITM Scenario.
The two policies developed to counter the MITM scenario are compared in Table 4.
Additionally, Policy 0 is included to illustrate differences in the integrity measure.
Note that Policy 0 provides no protection against modification of the data in-transit
by the attacker. Instead, it provides superior throughput since the data-CRC field is
used to transmit data instead of a dedicated CRC. Policy 6 and 7 provide protection
against data modification via the data-CRC while sacrificing throughput both before
and after an attack is detected.
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Table 4. Impact Scores for MITM Policies
Policy Description
Pre-Attack Post-Attack
C I A C I A
0 Split data over both channels 50% P N No Change
6 Send data over both channels until data-
CRC detects data modification. Then
transfer only over safe channel.
50% N 33% N N 67%
7 Send data over both channels until data-
CRC detects data modification. Then
transfer only over safe channel & fake data
over compromised channel.
50% N 33% N N 67%
4.4 Policy Selection
Table 5 shows all eight policies listed along with their rated performance in each
of the attack scenarios. The green highlighting represents the best performance pos-
sible for the policy against that scenario while the red squares represent a policy
which suffers a complete impact from the scenario. Those cells that show two ratings
separated by a slash represent the rating of the policy before and after the attack.
Finally, the blue highlighted cells represent a policy which performs best, but only
either before or after the attack.
By examining this table, it becomes possible for the user to select a policy that
best first their data requirements and potential threats. For instance, we can see that
Policy 0 would not be a good choice in a possible jamming scenario since it suffers
a complete loss of availability after a jamming attack. This is because the policy
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is unable to detect a jamming attack and instead will attempt to retransmit on the
affected channel. In another example, we can see that if the threat scenario includes
a potential MITM attack and the user wishes to ensure integrity while maximizing
throughput to the greatest extent possible, then Policy 6 and 7 are the best options.
This is because the policy will suffer less impact to throughput at only 33% after an
attack has begun, compared to 50% for other high-integrity policies such as Policy 1
and 2 which utilize only the safe channel.
Table 5. All Policy Performance Compared
Eavesdropper Jamming MITM
#
C I A D C I A D C I A D
0 50% N N No 50% N N/C No 50% 50% N No
1 N N 50% No N N N No N N 50% No
2 N N 50% Yes N N 50% Yes N N 50% Yes
3 N N 50% No N N 50% No N N 50% No
4 50% N N No 50%/N N N/50% No 50% 50% N No
5 50% N N No 50%/N N N/50% No 50% 50% N No
6 50% N 33% No 50% N 33%/C No 50%/N 50%/N 33%/67% No
7 50% N 33% No 50% N 33%/C No 50%/N 50%/N 33%/67% Yes
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V. Conclusion and Future Works
5.1 Conclusion
This proposed two-channel communication system may potentially benefit DoD
operations which utilize communication in contested environments. For UAVs operat-
ing over hostile territory, this could mean implementing more secure communications
at times when encryption is not yet viable or resource effective enough to justify it’s
use.
Our contribution of a policy comparison framework provides users a starting point
in which to classify and compare policies for use in policy selection given the data
security requirements and potential attack scenarios. The framework takes into ac-
count the main tenants of data-in-transit security while allowing users to expand on
it to incorporate other attributes if desired.
Additionally, the OMNeT++ simulation space provides future researchers a flex-
ible and extensible way in which to develop and test their policies in a variety of
scenarios. The system allows for testing of attacks against policies and evaluation
fo the results by examining data across either channel or performance characteristics
such as throughput.
In future work, the goal will be to improve on the range of policies available to
combat attack scenarios while exploring other threat models that may benefit from
the added security of two-channel data splitting. Lastly, moving the two-channel
system out of simulation and into live testing using hardware is a logical next step.
5.1.1 Research Questions.
The eight proof-of-concept policies along with the policy comparison framework
and simulation environment provide a means to answer the research questions poised
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in Section 1.4.
Based on evaluation of the policies discussed in Section 4.3, the first research ques-
tion can be answered in part, although future work may provide additional answers
to this question. This research showed that, at a minimum, the three studied threat
scenarios to include eavesdropping, jamming and MITM attacks can be mitigated to
varying degrees by implementing the two-channel data-splitting policies developed.
The second and third questions examine the data-splitting policies themselves and
can be answered using the policy comparison framework presented in Section 3.7. The
framework provides a standardized method in which to rate each security attribute
of the policy. As shown in Section 4.4, the best policy for each combination of data
requirements and threat scenarios can be identified after running the policies through
the developed comparison framework.
The last question can be answered using the OMNeT++ simulation space devel-
oped for this very purpose. The software-based policy and threat model implementa-
tions provide a place to build and test policies in a configurable two-channel system
without the need for more time consuming and expensive hardware components.
5.1.2 Contributions.
The contributions of this thesis are threefold: Create proof-of-concept data split-
ting policies that can be used to improve data-in-transit security, develop a framework
for comparing these policy’s CIA attributes and construct a simulation in which the
policies can be implemented and evaluated.
The eight policies presented were designed to thwart common cyber security attack
scenarios that exist in the DoD threatscape today. These policies, while simplistic,
provide a starting point for future research on the subject.
The policy comparison framework proposed can be utilized by future researchers
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to compare and contrast the CIA attributes and tunability of more complex policies
for the threat scenarios discussed herein or additional scenarios that were not studied
in this thesis.
Finally, the OMNeT++ simulation environment provides a basic proving ground
in which to construct and run future policies against these same scenarios. The
program is not all encompassing in its current form, but it can be expanded on to
provide additional data analysis and serves as a starting point for future research in
the field.
5.2 Future Work
Future research into this topic area could continue down a number of different
avenues. First, this thesis presented three different overarching attack scenarios for
which two-channel policies were developed to counteract. However, there are a num-
ber of additional attack methodologies that could potentially be mitigated through
the use of multi-channel communication schemes. Numerous different threats to com-
munications over wireless networks are presented in [12] and serve as a good starting
point to the study of additional scenarios.
In addition to more scenarios, more policies beyond the eight presented in this
thesis could be developed ot counteract the scenarios presented. The characteristics
of these policies could then be compared against the existing policies to determine
if they offer any advantages. Moreover, the simulation could be improved upon to
automatically select a policy based on the expected, or even detected, threat envi-
ronment.
Another fascinating study would include an analysis of data splitting schemes
among various file types. The results of this research would allow for the creation of
smarter data splitting policies that could be deployed based not only on the scenario
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and data requirements, but also on the type of data being transmitted. For instance, if
a sensitive MPEG video feed was being transmitted over-the-air, this type of research
would ensure the video data is split among the available channels in a way that ensures
maximum confidentiality.
Beyond the above, one could study the energy overhead required for utilizing a
second channel and compare it to the energy saved by not forgoing robust encryption
schemes. This could be accomplished using simulation software or even by building
out the system in hardware.
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Appendix A. Environment Setup
The software development and policy simulation conducted in Section IV was
completed on a 64-bit Windows 7 Service Pack 1 virtual machine (VM) running on
the freely available Oracle VirtualBox R© software. The environment was configured to
allow the VM the use of eight central processing unit cores, 6 GB of RAM and 60 GB
of hard drive space. This appendix lists the general instructions required ot setup and
configure the OMNeT++ v5.2.1 simulation environment once the operating system
has been installed.
1. Download OMNeT++ Discrete Event Simulator from https://www.omnetpp.org/omnetpp
2. Following the Windows instructions in Chapter 2 of the OMNeT++ installa-
tion guide found at https://omnetpp.org/doc/omnetpp/InstallGuide.pdf. OM-
NeT++ can also be installed on other operating systems using this guide.
3. Once installed, start OMNeT++ by double clicking the ’omnetpp.exe’ file or
running it from the command line. This executable should be located at
C:\omnetpp-5.2.1\ide\omnetpp.exe assuming OMNeT++ was installed on the
C: drive root directory.
4. The first time the IDE is opened, it will prompt the user to choose a workspace
directory. The ’samples’ workspace can be chosen by default or the user may
create their own directory to be used as a workspace.
Once OMNeT++ is installed and the IDE is open, the policy simulation project
can be imported and started with the following commands.
1. Click ’File’ in the top left corner of the IDE
2. Select ’Import’
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3. From the pop-up box, select ’General’ and highlight ’Existing Projects into
Workspace’, then press ’Next’
4. On the next screen, select the radio button for ’Select archive file:’
5. Click ’Browse’ and use the pop-up box to find and select the archive file provided
with this thesis (policy comparison.zip)
6. Select ’Finish’
OMNeT++ should now import the archived project and display it in the Project
Explorer window in the IDE. To run the program, right click the project and select
’Run As’ and then ’OMNeT++ Simulation’.
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